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<title>Year-2015</title>
<link>http://repository.iiitd.edu.in/xmlui/handle/123456789/212</link>
<description/>
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<rdf:li rdf:resource="http://repository.iiitd.edu.in/xmlui/handle/123456789/335"/>
<rdf:li rdf:resource="http://repository.iiitd.edu.in/xmlui/handle/123456789/283"/>
<rdf:li rdf:resource="http://repository.iiitd.edu.in/xmlui/handle/123456789/271"/>
<rdf:li rdf:resource="http://repository.iiitd.edu.in/xmlui/handle/123456789/224"/>
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<dc:date>2026-04-11T11:41:53Z</dc:date>
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<item rdf:about="http://repository.iiitd.edu.in/xmlui/handle/123456789/335">
<title>BluePark : tracking parking and un-parking events in indoor parking lot</title>
<link>http://repository.iiitd.edu.in/xmlui/handle/123456789/335</link>
<description>BluePark : tracking parking and un-parking events in indoor parking lot
Soubam, Sonia; Naik, Vinayak; Banerjee, Dipyaman; Chakraborty, Dipanjan
Finding a parking spot in a busy indoor parking lot is a daunting task. Retracing a parked vehicle can be equally frustrating. We present BluePark, a collaborative sensing mechanism using smartphone sensors to solve these problems&#13;
in real-time, without any input from user. We propose a novel technique of combining accelerometer and WiFi data to detect and localize parking and un-parking events in indoor parking lot. We validate our approach at the basement parking of a popular shopping mall. The proposed method&#13;
out-performs Google Activity Recognition API by 20% in detecting drive state in indoor parking lot. Our experiments show 100% precision and recall for parking and un-parking detection events at low accelerometer sampling rate of 15Hz,&#13;
irrespective of phone’s position. It has a low detection latency of 20 seconds with probability of 0.9 and good location&#13;
accuracy of 10 meters.
</description>
<dc:date>2015-10-26T03:37:01Z</dc:date>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://repository.iiitd.edu.in/xmlui/handle/123456789/283">
<title>Analyzing mutable checkpointing via invariants</title>
<link>http://repository.iiitd.edu.in/xmlui/handle/123456789/283</link>
<description>Analyzing mutable checkpointing via invariants
Aggarwal, Deepanker; Kiehn, Astrid
The well-known coordinated snapshot algorithm of mutable&#13;
checkpointing [7{9] is studied. We equip it with a concise formal model&#13;
and analyze its operational behavior via an invariant characterizing the&#13;
snapshot computation. By this we obtain a clear understanding of the&#13;
intermediate behavior and a correctness proof of the fi nal snapshot based&#13;
on a strong notion of consistency (reachability within the partial order&#13;
representing the underlying computation). The formal model further enables&#13;
a comparison with the blocking queue algorithm [13] introduced&#13;
for the same scenario and with the same objective.&#13;
From a broader perspective, we advocate the use of formal semantics to&#13;
formulate and prove correctness of distributed algorithms.
</description>
<dc:date>2015-09-10T09:41:32Z</dc:date>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://repository.iiitd.edu.in/xmlui/handle/123456789/271">
<title>Inference-based LLC-side access pattern estimation for shared cache modeling on commercial processors</title>
<link>http://repository.iiitd.edu.in/xmlui/handle/123456789/271</link>
<description>Inference-based LLC-side access pattern estimation for shared cache modeling on commercial processors
Hemani, Rakhi; Banerjee, Subhasis; Guha, Apala
Cache contention modeling is necessary for good resource utilization&#13;
on commercial multicore processors. Our goal is to build cache contention&#13;
models that are sensitive to changes in, 1) the micro-architecture, 2) the&#13;
co-runner set of each application, and, 3) the inputs to an application.&#13;
There are two challenges in achieving this goal: 1) it is di cult to deter-&#13;
mine the LLC behavior for a given memory access pattern, and, 2) it is&#13;
di cult to obtain the memory access pattern that reaches the LLC.&#13;
We propose, 1) a methodology to generate the behavioral model of&#13;
LLCs on protected-technology multicore processors, and, 2) an inference-&#13;
based approach to estimate the LLC-side memory access patterns. We&#13;
build a cache contention model that uses the behavioral LLC models and&#13;
the LLC-side memory access patterns. We evaluated the cache contention&#13;
model on two commercial multicores with Sandy Bridge and Ivy Bridge&#13;
micro-architectures respectively, using more than a thousand combina-&#13;
tions of nine SPEC CPU2006 benchmarks. The average prediction error&#13;
was 5.74% and 7.27% respectively.
</description>
<dc:date>2015-05-19T06:50:10Z</dc:date>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://repository.iiitd.edu.in/xmlui/handle/123456789/224">
<title>Biclique cryptanalysis of full round AES-128 based hashing modes</title>
<link>http://repository.iiitd.edu.in/xmlui/handle/123456789/224</link>
<description>Biclique cryptanalysis of full round AES-128 based hashing modes
Chang, Donghoon; Ghosh, Mohona; Sanadhya, Somitra Kumar
In this work, we revisit the security analysis of AES-128 instantiated hash modes. We use&#13;
biclique cryptanalysis technique as our basis for the attack. The traditional biclique approach used&#13;
for key recovery in AES (and preimage search in AES based compression function) cannot be applied&#13;
directly to hash function settings due to restrictions imposed on message input due to padding. Under&#13;
this criteria, we show how to translate biclique technique to hash domain and demonstrate preimage&#13;
and second preimage attack on all 12 PGV modes. Our preimage attack complexity for all PGV modes&#13;
stands at 2127.4. The second preimage attack complexities differ based on the PGV construction chosen -&#13;
the lowest being 2126.3 and the highest being 2126.67 complexity. We also show how to model our attacks&#13;
under different settings, e.g., when message is padded/ not padded, when chaining variable is known/not&#13;
known, when full message or key space is available/ not available to the attacker etc. Our attacks require&#13;
only 2 message blocks with padding included and works on full 10 rounds of AES-128 for all 12 PGV&#13;
modes. In our attacks, the IV is assumed to be a known constant which is a practical assumption but&#13;
knowledge of other chaining variables is not required for the attacker. Considering these, our results&#13;
can be termed as the best so far in literature. Though our attack results do not significantly decrease&#13;
the attack complexity factor as compared to brute force but they highlight the actual security margin&#13;
provided by these constructions.
</description>
<dc:date>2015-03-23T04:05:04Z</dc:date>
</item>
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