<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<rss xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" version="2.0">
<channel>
<title>Year-2020</title>
<link>http://repository.iiitd.edu.in/xmlui/handle/123456789/822</link>
<description/>
<pubDate>Mon, 06 Apr 2026 20:39:29 GMT</pubDate>
<dc:date>2026-04-06T20:39:29Z</dc:date>
<item>
<title>Maginot lines and tourniquets : on the defendability of national cyberspace</title>
<link>http://repository.iiitd.edu.in/xmlui/handle/123456789/843</link>
<description>Maginot lines and tourniquets : on the defendability of national cyberspace
Gosain, Devashish; Rawat, Madhur; Sharma, Piyush Kumar; Acharya, Hrishikesh Bhatt
National governments know the Internet as both a blessing and a headache. On the one hand, it unlocks great economic and strategic opportunity. On the other hand, government, military, or emergency-services become vulnerable to scans (Shodan), attacks (DDoS from botnets like Mirai), etc., when made accessible on the Internet. How hard is it for a national government to effectively secure its entire cyberspace? We approach this problem from the view that a coordinated defense involves monitors and access control (firewalls etc.) to inspect traffic entering or leaving the country, as well as internal traffic. In several case studies, we consistently find a natural Line of Defense — a small number of Autonomous Systems (ASes) that intercept most (&gt; 95%) network paths in the country. We conclude that in many countries, the structure of the Internet actually makes it practical to build a nation-scale cordon, to detect and filter cyber attacks.
</description>
<pubDate>Wed, 01 Jan 2020 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
<guid isPermaLink="false">http://repository.iiitd.edu.in/xmlui/handle/123456789/843</guid>
<dc:date>2020-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
</item>
</channel>
</rss>
